24 volumes on military strategy zhuge liang

24 Volumes On Military Strategy Zhuge Liang Full Of Nonsense

Commentators on Sun Tzu invariably cite his campaign against the state of Chu in 506 BC as evidence of his strategic acumen.

To stick to old ways of doing things after the times have altered is like the people of Yue practicing archery.

The Huainanzi (2nd century BC text) 1 Zhuge Liang wept bitterly when presented with Ma Sus severed head.

Since Chinas famed strategist personally ordered the execution of Ma Su, one of his own subordinate commanders, this reaction puzzled some of Zhuge Liangs advisors.

I am thinking of the late Emperor, warning me not to use this man because his deeds would not match his boasts.

The late kings words have proved too true, leaving me now to rue my blindness.

Ma Su was renowned for his diligent study of classical strategic texts, yet he lacked any practical military experience.

When Zhuge Liang tapped him for the vital mission of holding the strategic crossroads near Jieting against a large and capable military force led by Sima Yi, Ma Su confidently replied: Lifelong study of military science has given me a good understanding of warfare.

When Ma Sus second-in-command, the battle-hardened Wang Ping, suggested they instead hold Jieting by establishing a defense-in-depth centered on the vital crossroads and nearby a source of fresh water, Ma Su upbraided him: Thats really a womans way of seeing things Sun Tzu has said, Soldiers always survive when threatened by death.

Dont make things difficult 4 The enemy commander, also determined to make things difficult for Ma Su, quickly surrounded his isolated forces and cut off their access to the water supply.

Instead of spurring his soldiers to fight fearlessly for their lives when encircled, as The Art of War assured its readers it would, Ma Sus army instead panicked, attempted to flee, and was decisively defeated.

Zhuge Liang was apoplectic over Ma Sus military ineptitude and only managed to stave off complete disaster by gambling on a risky empty fortress stratagem; thereby fooling Sima Yi into believing that this was all part of an elaborate ruse to draw him into a devastating ambush.

Some might be surprised at this blunt disparagement of one of the worlds most revered military texts., but they shouldnt be.

Sun Tzus own contemporaries and later Chinese thinkers did not shy away from spirited debates over the enduring wisdom found in his work.

Chinese historian Sima Qian describes a figure similar to Ma Su named Zhao Kuo, who was also well known for his meticulous study of strategic texts, but likewise lacked concrete military experience.

When the king appointed him as the overall army commander based solely on his rhetorical skills in debating military matters, the result was a disaster.

At the Battle of Changping in 260 BC, Zhao Kuo was quickly drawn into a trap and killed.

As a consequence, all 400,000 soldiers under his command were executed by the victorious Qin forces.5 Much later, the Qing dynasty emperor Kangxi (r.

AD), himself a successful military commander and the first ruler to bring Tibet and Taiwan under firm Chinese control, expressed disdain for those who advocated reliance on ancient texts to solve contemporary military problems.

24 Volumes On Military Strategy Zhuge Liang Full Of Nonsense

The so-called Seven Military Classics are full of nonsense about water and fire, lucky omens and advice on the weather, all at random and contradicting each other.

I told my officials once that if you followed these books you would never win a battle.6 One of the most extensive critiques of Sun Tzu comes from the third century BC Confucian philosopher, Xunzi.

In a chapter titled A Debate on Military Affairs, King Xiaocheng of Zhao asks about the most crucial aspects of military strategy.

Lord Linwu, invoking the name of Sun Tzu, argues that following the advice laid out in his book is the surest way to achieving victory.

Xunzi vehemently disagrees and launches into a lengthy discourse as to why relying on the guidance of Sun Tzu might produce ephemeral gains, the inherent weakness of his overall military theory inevitably results in strategic defeat.

Xunzi suggests that adherence to the military counsel of Sun Tzu is so detrimental to ones own self-interest, that it would be equivalent to using ones finger to stir a boiling pot.7 Xunzis pessimism is not without historical basis.